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This article reviews social psychological theory and empirical research
on perceiving and reporting discrimination. The article begins with an exami-
nation of factors that affect whether individuals perceive themselves as targets
of discrimination. We then turn toward addressing whether individuals
who perceive discrimination are willing to report their perceptions, as well
as the interpersonal consequences they might face for so doing. Throughout
this article, we examine how endorsement of the meritocratic worldview shapes
these discrimination-related processes. Finally, we conclude by noting the
potential for important theoretical, empirical, and applied advances on dis-
crimination scholarship that can arise from interdisciplinary collaboration
among legal scholars and social scientists.
 
At a recent academic conference examining the underrepresentation
of women in fields such as mathematics and science, former Harvard University
president Lawrence Summers made some now infamous remarks about one
potential cause of this gender disparity. Summers suggested that gender dif-
ferences in “innate abilities” might be one explanation for the underrepre-
sentation of women in these fields. Not surprisingly, his comments provoked
a firestorm of attention and controversy. For example, one supporter stated,
“I think that Larry Summers is an excellent president of Harvard, firmly com-
mitted and deeply respectful of the role of women in universities and one
who is anxious to strengthen and enhance that.” In contrast, a critic remarked,
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men and women, I just couldn’t breathe because this kind of bias makes
me physically ill.” Would it surprise you to learn that both of these comments
were made by prominent female academics?
In this article we describe social psychological theory and research that
has examined how members of historically disadvantaged (protected) groups
respond to situations where they are potential victims of prejudice and dis-
crimination. We begin by reviewing empirical research that has addressed
how likely individuals are to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination
and factors that affect this perception. Next, we review research investigating
the likelihood that individuals who perceive discrimination will publicly
report those perceptions and the social consequences of doing so. Collectively,
this literature helps to understand why members of the very same social group
can hear the same objective remarks and construe them so differently. Finally,
we consider the implications of social psychological theory and research on
discrimination for legal issues, as well as legal scholarship. For instance, judges
and juries make assumptions that people who experience discrimination will
recognize it and subsequently complain about this treatment. If these assump-
tions turn out to be inaccurate, the consequences are potentially quite serious.
Social psychology is a discipline that uses scientific methods in an
attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors
of individuals are influenced by features of the social context (Allport 1985).
Social context includes the actual and implied presence of other individuals
and groups, as well as cultural practices and beliefs. Scientific analysis of
empirical data is central to a social psychological approach. Although findings
based on this empirical approach may sometimes confirm commonsense
notions about behavior, in many instances they challenge current social
beliefs and lead to new insights about behavior. Thus, a social psychological
perspective on the law uses scientifically derived findings about cognition,
emotion, and behavior in social contexts to inform and bring new under-
standing to legal issues. In this article, we will examine how the meritocratic





A perception of discrimination is a judgment that one has been treated
unfairly because of his or her social group membership (Major, Quinton, and
McCoy 2002). Because discrimination perceptions involve subjective con-
struals of the environment, it is often difficult to determine whether an indi-
vidual’s perception of the amount of discrimination he or she is experiencing
accurately reflects the level of discrimination that truly exists in a given
context. There are two major types of perception biases that can occur. Indi-
viduals might see more discrimination than actually exists (a vigilance bias),
 
Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination 803
 
or they might see less discrimination than actually exists (a minimization
bias). The question of whether individuals tend to err toward minimization
or vigilance perception biases has been addressed in great detail elsewhere
(see Major, Quinton, et al. 2002; Major and Kaiser 2005; Major and O’Brien




There are a variety of reasons why one might expect members of pro-
tected groups to be vigilant, or on guard, for signs that they might be victims
of discrimination and to err on the side of seeing discrimination where it
does not exist. A past history of experiencing discrimination can lead to
increased activation of discrimination-related thoughts when individuals are
faced with ambiguous circumstances. These thoughts, in turn, can bias how
ambiguous events are interpreted (Inman and Baron 1996). Being vigilant
for discrimination can protect an individual from potential harm if he or
she is faced with a hostile work environment where prejudice is overt
(Feldman-Barrett and Swim 1998). In addition, blaming negative outcomes,
such as termination, suspension, or a poor job review on discrimination can
buffer feelings of self-worth (Crocker and Major 1989; Major, Kaiser and
McCoy 2003). Thus, there are good reasons why one might expect members
of protected groups to be vigilant for evidence of discrimination (see Allport
1954; Cohen, Steele, and Ross 1999; Feldman-Barrett and Swim 1998; Steele
et al. 2002).
Nonetheless, empirical evidence that members of historically disadvan-
taged groups claim discrimination when none exists, or even that they are
especially sensitive to and vigilant for discrimination, is sparse. Members of
protected groups are more likely than members of nonprotected groups to
report on surveys that they have been victims of discrimination, but because
the former are more likely than the latter to in fact objectively experience
discrimination, this gives us no information about vigilance. In an effort to
circumvent this problem, several experiments have compared perceptions of
discrimination among protected and nonprotected groups in response to the
same event, on the assumption that if the former are vigilant for discrimi-
nation, they will be more likely than the latter to interpret the same situations
as due to discrimination. Several studies have shown that women are more
likely than men to label negative treatment committed by a high-status per-
petrator against a low-status victim as discrimination (Major, Kaiser, et al.
2003; Rodin et al. 1990). In addition, African American college students
who received critical feedback on an essay they had written from an evaluator
who was aware of their race were more likely to say that the evaluator was
biased than were European American students who received the same type
of feedback (Cohen et al. 1999). Importantly, both groups had received
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identical critical comments from evaluators who were in fact unaware of their
race. Thus, objectively, bias did not exist. Collectively, these studies provide
suggestive evidence that members of protected groups may more readily per-
ceive themselves as victims of discrimination than members of nonprotected
groups in the same situation.
In contrast to these findings, however, other experiments have found
no differences in the extent to which members of protected groups (women,
Latinos) and nonprotected groups (men, European Americans) blame a rejec-
tion on discrimination, when the circumstances are identical (i.e., both are
rejected by a member of the other group) (Major, Gramzow, et al. 2003).
In addition, in the Cohen et al. (1999) experiment described above, African
American students did not see the evaluator as more biased than White stu-
dents did when the critique was accompanied by comments indicating that
the evaluator thought the essay writer was capable of meeting high standards.
This latter finding illustrates the extent to which perceptions of discrimi-
nation are influenced by subtle features of the social context. Another recent
study showed that as the threat of discrimination in the environment increases,
so too does vigilance for discrimination. In this study, women were led to
believe that they were going to interact with a sexist or feminist man, via
an exchange of an attitude questionnaire with the man. Women who thought
they were going to interact with a sexist man paid more attention to sub-
liminally presented words (words presented below conscious awareness) that
were relevant to sexism compared to other threatening words that were not
relevant to sexism. In contrast, women who thought they were going to inter-
act with a feminist man tended to allocate less attention to subliminally
presented sexism words that were relevant to sexism compared to the threat-




An alternative perspective holds that people err on the side of “missing”
discrimination, that is, they often fail to notice discrimination, underestimate
it, or deny being the target of discrimination, even when they objectively
are. This perspective is evident in the theorizing of many psychologists, politi-
cal scientists, sociologists, and philosophers, who observe that hierarchical
social systems persist in large part because members of low-status groups do
not recognize the illegitimacy of their disadvantaged position in the status
system (e.g., Crosby 1984; Jost 1995; Major 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).
Why might individuals fail to recognize that they are targets of discrimination
when they objectively are? Some scholars assert that recognizing that one
is a victim of discrimination is psychologically costly, in that it requires aban-
doning fundamental and adaptive beliefs, such as those conveying that the
social world is personally controllable, fair, and legitimate (Jost and Banaji
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1994; Langer 1975; Lerner and Miller 1978; Major 1994; Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, and Solomon 1997; Taylor and Brown 1988). Others observe
that individuals often fail to perceive discrimination, because it is difficult
to detect on a case-by-case basis where each individual’s outcomes can be
attributed to multiple causes. Studies indicate that discrimination becomes
more evident when a number of group members experience similar negative
outcomes, thus increasing the salience of the link between negative treatment
and social group membership (Crosby et al. 1986). Yet, another reason why
individuals may not realize when they are victims of discrimination is that
discrimination is often masked, hidden, or outwardly denied because it is socially
frowned upon or illegal (Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien 2003; Gaertner
and Dovidio 1986).
Results of several studies are consistent with the idea the people often
err on the side of minimizing, or not seeing, discrimination when it is directed
at the self. A number of studies have shown that people report that they
personally experience less discrimination than does the average member of
their social group (Crosby 1984; Taylor, Wright, and Porter 1994). Studies
also have shown that people often avoid labeling their negative experiences
as discrimination, even when these experiences qualify as such (Magley et al.
1999; Vorauer and Kumhyr 2001). University students in one study were
asked to list just one social group membership they possessed that caused
them to experience discrimination. They made their responses in complete
anonymity. Women and ethnic minorities were more likely to list their gender
and ethnicity, respectively, relative to men and European Americans. How-
ever, only 9 percent of the women reported experiencing gender discrimi-
nation and only 48 percent of the ethnic minorities reported experiencing
racism. In fact 42 percent of the women and 36 percent of the ethnic minorities
could not think of a single social group they belonged to that experienced
discrimination (Stangor et al. 2003).
Evidence consistent with the idea that members of disadvantaged groups
may not recognize when they are victims of subtle prejudice and discrimi-
nation also emerges from an experiment in which Aboriginal participants
(a low-status group in Canada) engaged in a discussion with a White Cana-
dian interaction partner (a high-status group) (Vorauer and Kumhyr 2001).
On the basis of their scores on a prejudice scale they had completed earlier,
the White partners were classified as either high in prejudice or low in
prejudice toward Aboriginals. Aboriginal participants who were paired with
a White interaction partner who was highly prejudiced experienced more
affective discomfort and were more self-critical compared to Aboriginal
participants who interacted with a low-prejudice White partner. This suggests
that the former had been targets of subtle prejudice and discrimination. None-





 perceive that they were targets of prejudice. Furthermore,
Aboriginal participants did not view high-prejudiced White partners as being
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more prejudiced than low-prejudiced White partners, nor did they feel they
had been stereotyped more by high-prejudice than low-prejudice White
partners. Clearly, these results are inconsistent with a view of members of





In sum, there is some evidence to support both a minimization and
vigilance perspective on perceptions of discrimination. In a review of this
literature, Major, Quinton, et al. (2002) called for research to move beyond
this dichotomy to examine the personal, situational, and structural factors
that influence individuals’ likelihood of seeing themselves (or their group)
as a victim of discrimination. (We recommend that readers interested in a full
understanding of the moderators of perceiving discrimination see their review.)
In this article we focus on how endorsement of the meritocratic worldview—
a worldview in which outcomes are seen as due to hard work, merit, and are
deserved—affects perceptions of discrimination. In the following section we
introduce theory on this meritocratic worldview and then summarize empirical




All cultures provide social lenses for interpreting human thought, emo-
tion, and behavior (Fiske et al. 1998). In the United States, one core cultural
belief is the notion that individuals possess free will and largely control their
own destiny (Fiske et al. 1998). For example, Plaut, Markus, and Lachman
(2002) demonstrated widespread endorsement in the United States of three
central values that characterize this core cultural feature: independence, the
Protestant Ethic, and the American Dream. Independence involves the desire
to live free from the constraint of others and the belief that survival depends
upon self-reliance and stamina (Triandis 1995). The Protestant Ethic empha-
sizes the moral superiority of hard work, commitment to goals, and indus-
triousness (Weber 1904/1958). The American Dream combines these notions
about independence and the Protestant Ethic and conveys that the greatest
good is to be individually successful and that almost anyone, regardless of
life circumstances, can succeed through dedication, perseverance, and hard
work (Hochschild 1995; Spindler and Spindler 1990). Together, the endorse-
ment of these values, norms, and beliefs comprises a cultural belief system
that we refer to as the meritocratic worldview.
Although we argue that the meritocratic worldview is a core component
of U.S. culture, we do not mean to imply that this worldview is specific to
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the United States. Indeed, Cuddy et al. (2005) have shown that across many
individualistic (e.g., Germany, United Kingdom) and even collectivistic
(Japan, Hong Kong) cultures, successful groups are seen as deserving of their
success, and unsuccessful groups are seen as deserving of their failure. In this
article we focus on how a meritocratic worldview relates to data collected
in the United States, as well as the implications of these beliefs for legal
processes in the United States.
The meritocratic worldview has been theoretically conceptualized and
empirically investigated with a number of related constructs, including the
Protestant Ethic, the Belief in a Just World (the notion that individuals get
what they deserve and deserve what they get), and Individual Mobility Beliefs
(the belief that advancement is possible for all people in America) (e.g.,
Biernat, Vescio, and Theno 1996; Katz and Hass 1988; Lerner 1980; Major,
Gramzow et al. 2002; Quinn and Crocker 1999). Although these beliefs are
individually held, they gain their influence through their collective endorse-
ment within a culture. Moreover, even though individuals will vary in the
extent to which they endorse the meritocratic worldview, the values under-
lying the worldview will continue to exert their influence through symbolic
cultural representations (e.g., the Declaration of Independence) and systematic
processes (e.g., the merit system) that are pervasive in society (Plaut et al.
2002). Thus, despite individual differences in endorsement of the meritocratic
worldview, the belief system will still serve as the basis of powerful social
representations within the culture.
The meritocratic worldview serves several important functions for those
who endorse it. Of primary importance to this article is the justification func-
tion of this belief system. Because the beliefs comprising the meritocratic
worldview locate the causes of events internally within attributes of indi-
viduals, endorsing this belief system leads to the inference that individuals
are responsible for their position in life (Furnham and Procter 1989; Kluegel
and Smith 1986; Lerner 1980). The meritocratic worldview creates the per-
ception that individuals who succeed in life are responsible for and deserving
of their success because they have worked hard, and individuals who experi-
ence failure are responsible for and deserving of their outcomes because they
simply have not worked hard enough.
In addition to justifying the outcomes and life situations of individuals,
this meritocratic worldview carries with it the power to justify the outcomes
and circumstances faced by entire social groups. Specifically, when beliefs
in internal causality and personal responsibility are applied to the group level,
they imply that groups at the top rungs of the social hierarchy are entitled
to their privileged status because they worked hard, and groups at the bottom
rungs of the hierarchy are to blame for their low status because they have
not worked hard enough. That is, the meritocratic worldview makes what
looks, at first glance, like evidence of injustice, appear as fair, natural, and
legitimate, because the social hierarchy reflects differential inputs and efforts
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of social groups (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost and Hunyady 2002; Major 1994).
Indeed, Sidanius and Pratto (1999; Pratto et al. 1994) have shown that Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO)—the preference for group-based hierarchies—
exists in the United States (and other hierarchically structured societies),
and that this belief system predicts a number of behaviors aimed at preserving
the status quo (e.g., SDO predicts opposition to affirmative action and other
social-change based policies).
By providing individuals with the perception that the social world is
a controllable and fair enterprise where individuals and groups receive what
they deserve, the meritocratic worldview conveys a secondary benefit to those
who endorse it. Because these beliefs provide individuals with a sense of
control over their social world, those who endorse the meritocratic worldview
experience a host of beneficial psychological outcomes, including enhanced
well-being, motivation, hope, and mastery orientation (Abramson, Seligman,
and Teasdale 1978; Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski 1997; Janoff-Bulman
1989; Tomaka and Blascovich 1994). Furthermore, because the meritocratic
worldview serves to satisfy these fundamental human needs, individuals will
be motivated to endorse this belief system and will feel threatened when
they encounter evidence that is inconsistent with the cultural worldview
(Greenberg et al. 1997; Hafer 2002; Jost and Hunyady 2003; Kaiser, Vick,
and Major 2004; Lerner 1980).
 
The Meritocratic Worldview and Perceiving Discrimination
 
Endorsement of the meritocratic worldview has important implications
for understanding when members of high- and low-status groups will perceive
themselves as targets of discrimination. Because endorsing this meritocratic
worldview results in seeing low-status group members as deserving of their
poor outcomes, the more low-status group members endorse these beliefs,
the more they will minimize the extent to which they face discrimination.
This prediction, which Major, Gramzow, et al. (2002) dubbed “The Status-
Legitimacy Hypothesis,” is grounded in theoretical insights from social justice
research that demonstrates that the motivation to justify the status hierarchy
is so pervasive that low-status group members are motivated to do this even
when these hierarchies are disadvantageous to themselves and their social
groups (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost and Hunyady 2003; Kluegel and Smith
1986; Major 1994). In contrast, because endorsing the meritocratic worldview
leaves members of high-status groups feeling entitled to their privileged posi-
tion, the more they endorse the worldview, the more sensitive they will be
toward perceiving signs of reverse discrimination. In other words, endorsing
the meritocratic worldview leads members of high-status groups to anticipate
preferential treatment (because they assume they have greater abilities), and
they will feel threatened and slighted when members of low-status groups
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receive better treatment than they do, particularly when the treatment occurs
in domains that are relevant to status differentials (Jost and Hunyady 2003;
Major, Gramzow, et al. 2002). Hence, seeing their negative outcomes as
stemming from reverse discrimination can be one way to maintain their faith
in the worldview that conveys that they should be at the top of the social
hierarchy.
Evidence from correlational research supports this prediction that
endorsing the meritocratic worldview is associated with decreased perceptions
of discrimination among low-status group members. For example, among
working women, a group that fares poorly on objective employment out-
comes, such as salary and promotions relative to men, endorsing the Belief
in a Just World is associated with reports of less discontent about the status
of women workers (Hafer and Olson 1993). Similarly, the more African
American and Latino American students endorsed individual mobility beliefs,
the less likely they were to report that they personally have been victims
of ethnic discrimination (Major, Gramzow, et al. 2002). Likewise, the more
Latino American undergraduates perceived themselves as having personal
control over their lives, the less likely they were to see themselves as targets
of racism (Shoery et al. 2002). Thus, these studies suggest that endorsing
the meritocratic worldview may lead members of devalued social groups to
blame negative outcomes on themselves, rather than on discrimination.
Although studies examining perceived discrimination among high-status
groups are relatively rare in the social psychological literature, there is some
evidence that endorsing the meritocratic worldview is associated with increased
perceptions of discrimination among high-status group members. For exam-
ple, Major, Gramzow, et al. (2002) found that the more European American




 likely they were to
report that they personally had been a victim of ethnic discrimination. Addi-
tionally, among European American college students, endorsing Social Domi-
nance Orientation is positively associated with seeing their ethnic group
(but not themselves) as targets of racism (Shorey, Cowen, and Sullivan 2002).
These data provide some evidence that members of high-status groups who
endorse the meritocratic worldview might be most susceptible to perceiving
reverse discrimination. Although correlational data provide some support for
the claim that endorsing the meritocratic worldview has different implications
for perceiving discrimination among high- and low-status groups, one must
be very cautious about drawing causal conclusions about these relationships.
Because these studies rely on self-report measures administered at a single
time point, it is possible that perceptions of discrimination lead to changes
in meritocratic worldview endorsement (rather than vice versa), or that some
unidentified third variable is the cause of the association. Thus, it is important
to consider the findings from research employing experimental methods.
In an experimental investigation of the Status-Legitimacy Hypothesis
(Major, Gramzow, et al. 2002), Latino American and European American
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undergraduates who had previously completed a meritocratic worldview
measure (individual mobility beliefs) reported individually to the laboratory
to partake in a study on workgroup performance. When participants arrived
for the study, the experimenter led them to a private cubicle and informed
them that two other participants had already arrived and were seated in other
cubicles elsewhere in the laboratory. In actuality, there were no other indi-
viduals present except for the actual participant. Participants were then told
that one of the other participants had already been randomly assigned to
the role of manager and that the manager was to assign the remaining two
roles to the other two participants. One of these roles was a desirable comanager
position (the comanager was eligible to win a monetary prize), and the other
was an undesirable clerk position (the clerk was not eligible for the monetary
prize and was responsible for taking notes on the management team’s
decisions). The participants then completed application material and demo-
graphic information (including their ethnicity) for the manager to review.
While waiting for the manager to make a selection decision, the par-
ticipants were shown the digital photographs of the other individuals pre-
sumably taking part in the study. These photographs were used to manipulate
the ethnicity of the manager and other comanager applicant. In one con-
dition, the photographs displayed two individuals of the same sex as the par-
ticipant but of a different ethnicity. Thus, Latino American students thought
they were interacting with a European American manager and comanager
applicant and European American students thought they were interacting
with a Latino American manager and comanager applicant. In a second
condition, the photographs displayed two same-sex participants, but this time
the manager was always portrayed as the same ethnicity as the participant,
and the comanager applicant was of a different ethnicity. Thus, Latino American
participants presumed they were interacting with a Latino American manager
and a European American comanager applicant and European American par-
ticipants thought they were interacting with a European American manager
and a Latino American comanager applicant.
Several minutes later, the participants learned that the manager assigned
them to the undesirable clerk role because he or she thought they would
not work well together. After experiencing this rejection, participants com-
pleted a measure assessing the extent to which they believed their rejection
was due to ethnic discrimination. The results revealed that endorsing the
meritocratic worldview had different implications in understanding how Latino
American and European American participants interpreted being rejected
by a member of a different ethnic group. When a European American man-
ager selected another European American student to serve as the desirable
comanager, the more Latino American participants endorsed the meritocratic
worldview, the less likely they were to report that their rejection resulted
from ethnic discrimination. In contrast, when a Latino American manager
selected another Latino American participant for the comanager position,
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the more European American students endorsed the meritocratic worldview,
the more likely they were to blame their rejection on discrimination. When
participants were rejected by a manager belonging to their own ethnic group,
endorsement of the meritocratic worldview was not associated with discrimi-
nation perceptions for either Latino American or European American
participants, suggesting that endorsement of the meritocratic worldview is
related to discrimination perceptions only in situations where discrimination
is a plausible explanation for one’s treatment.
A subsequent experiment replicated the outgroup rejection experience
described above with gender rather than ethnicity as a proxy for social status
(Major, Gramzow, et al. 2002). In this experiment, male and female partic-
ipants were rejected for a comanager position by a manager of the other
gender who always chose a member of his or her own gender for that desirable
role. Consistent with the status-legitimacy hypothesis, the more women
endorsed the meritocratic worldview, the less likely they were to blame being
passed over in favor of a man by a male manager on sexism. In contrast, the
more men endorsed the meritocratic worldview, the more likely they were to
blame being passed over in favor of a woman by a female manager on sexism.
Situational cues that temporarily activate beliefs associated with the
meritocratic worldview can also affect how people interpret rejection. In a
conceptual replication of the status-legitimacy gender study just described,
McCoy and Major (in press) examined how temporary cognitive activation of
meritocratic worldview beliefs affects how men and women interpreted being
rejected for the comanager position by a manager of the other gender group.
In this study, prior to the rejection experience, half the participants completed
a task that served to prime meritocratic worldview beliefs (Bargh, Chen, and
Burrows 1996; Srull and Wyer 1979). These participants unscrambled sentences,
which when unscrambled created phrases consistent with the meritocratic
worldview (e.g., “effort positive prosperity leads to” unscrambles to “Effort leads
to positive prosperity”). The other half of the participants were primed with
neutral content and were thus assigned to unscramble sentences that were
unrelated to the meritocratic worldview. Consistent with the status-legitimacy
hypothesis, when participants were primed with the meritocratic worldview,
women were less likely than men to blame their rejection on discrimination.
However, when participants were primed with neutral content, women were
more likely than men to blame their rejection of discrimination. This experiment
further demonstrates that the culture worldview is an important moderator
of the relationship between social status and perceiving discrimination.
These experimental investigations of the status-legitimacy hypothesis
are important for a number of reasons. First, by controlling the nature of
the discriminatory event, they assured that both members of high- and low-
status groups based their perceptions of discrimination on the same objective
event. In correlational research, it is impossible to determine the type and
severity of the events that members of low-status groups consider when judging
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the extent to which they are see themselves as targets of discrimination.
Second, these studies demonstrate that the predicted relationship between
meritocratic worldview endorsement and perceiving discrimination occurs
only in contexts where discrimination is plausible (e.g., intergroup rejection)
and not in less plausible contexts (e.g., ingroup rejection). This suggests that
meritocratic worldview endorsement will predict discrimination perceptions
in some but not all contexts. Third, these studies reach similar conclusions
using both ethnicity and gender as proxies for social status. This suggests
that the relationship between meritocratic worldview endorsement and
perceiving discrimination is not limited to a single type of social hierarchy.
Fourth, by manipulating the salience of the meritocratic worldview, the
McCoy and Major (in press) experiment demonstrates that activation of the
meritocratic worldview causes the observed changes in perceptions of dis-
crimination. This suggests that environments where the meritocratic world-
view is pervasive (such as meritocracy-based employment institutions), might
lead members of devalued groups to minimize discrimination and members
of high-status groups to become more sensitive to signs of reverse discrimi-
nation. Finally, these studies point to the importance of adopting a variability
perspective when investigating whether individuals perceive discrimination.
That is, low-status group members were on average no more or no less likely
than high-status group members to perceive discrimination in the experiments.
Status differences in perceptions of discrimination occurred only as a function




Individual, situational, and cultural factors influence the extent to which
individuals will regard themselves as victims of discrimination. The research
described above illustrates that naturally occurring and experimentally
manipulated variation in participants’ endorsement of meritocratic beliefs
dominant in the United States influence individuals’ likelihood of seeing
themselves as targets of discrimination. Members of protected groups who
strongly endorse these beliefs are less likely to see themselves as victims of
discrimination than those who reject them. In the next part of this article
we consider the psychological predicament of individuals who publicly claim
they are targets of discrimination. Again, we propose that the meritocratic




Individuals who do perceive themselves as targets of discrimination face
a dilemma: Should they share their perceptions with others or keep this
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information to themselves? What decision do individuals typically make?
Scholars have addressed this question with three different types of research
approaches, and the answer to this question seems to depend upon the
methodological approach. Below, we briefly describe these approaches and
review the merits of each methodological approach. In the section that
follows, we focus primarily on reports of discrimination by members of
low-status social groups. We focus on members of low-status groups because
most empirical work has addressed this question among these groups. We
discuss research on high-status social groups’ reports of discrimination




The most direct way to assess whether individuals report or suppress
their discrimination perceptions is to simply ask them to reflect on how they
handled past experiences with discrimination. For example, a recent tele-
phone survey of roughly 1,000 Americans revealed that 28 percent of the
African American respondents believed that they experienced workplace
discrimination within the past year (being passed over for a promotion,
being assigned undesirable tasks, and hearing racist comments were the
most frequent complaints) (Dixon, Storen, and Van Horn 2002). Of these
individuals who perceived discrimination, approximately one-third (32 percent)
reported keeping their complaints to themselves. Of those who did report
the incident, the most frequent responses were speaking with a supervisor
(29 percent) and filing a complaint according to company policy (19 percent).
Leaving one’s job (4 percent), suing the company (3 percent), and con-
fronting the perpetrator (2 percent) were all infrequent responses to perceived
discrimination.
Retrospective research on women’s responses to perceived sexual
harassment also reveals that many individuals who perceive discrimination
decide to keep their claims to themselves. For example, in a retrospective
study of 8,000 federal employees (US Merit System Protection Board, 1995),
44 percent of the female respondents reported experiencing at least one
incident of sexual harassment in the past two years. Ignoring the situation
or doing nothing at all was the most common response to the harassment
(45 percent). Of the reporting behaviors examined in this study, asking the
perpetrator to stop (41 percent), making a joke about the behavior (14 per-
cent), reporting the behavior to a supervisor (13 percent), and threatening





 When the women is this study were asked what type of behavior
 
1. Percentages do not add up to 100 percent because respondents could endorse multiple
behaviors.
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they thought would be best suited to stopping the harassment almost all
(88 percent) reported that asking the perpetrator to stop would be a highly
effective remedy. Thus, these women thought that speaking up about the
harassment would be helpful, but less than half of the harassed women chose
to engage in this behavior.
Similarly, a study examining employed Hispanic women with a past his-
tory of perceived sexual harassment found that just 38 percent of the harassed
women reported engaging in organizational level remediation attempts (such
as speaking with a supervisor, reporting the perpetrator, filing a formal complaint,
or a grievance) (Cortina 2004). Collectively, these retrospective studies sug-
gest that that there are barriers that prevent members of low-status groups
from reporting discrimination, and that it would be a mistake to measure the
prevalence of discrimination by examining reports of discrimination claims.
Though research examining reports of reverse discrimination claims is
relatively rare, the limited work addressing this issue suggests that these types
of perceptions are also likely to be suppressed. For example, of the European
American respondents in the employment discrimination telephone survey
described above, 6 percent reported experiencing workplace discrimination
due to their race in the past year, and of these individuals, 50 percent reported
keeping these perceptions of discrimination to themselves. Similarly, in the
sexual harassment study of 8,000 federal employees previously described, 19
percent of the men in the study reported experiencing sexual harassment
in the past two years. Of interest, male sexual harassment is perpetrated by
other men at least as frequently as it is perpetrated by women (Waldo, Berdahll,
and Fitzgerald 1998). The most common response among these harassed men
was to ignore the harassment (44 percent reported this behavior). Those
that did report the harassment relied on the following strategies: telling the
perpetrator to stop (23 percent), making a joke about the behavior (15 per-
cent), reporting the behavior to a supervisor (8 percent), and threatening




Although retrospective reports of reactions to discrimination are best
able to capture reactions to real-world discriminatory events occurring to a
wide variety of target groups, there are some problems with interpreting the
results from these studies. First, participants need to label their experiences
as discrimination in order to reflect on their responses in these situations.
Because individuals sometimes avoid labeling objectively discriminatory
behaviors as such (Magley et al. 1999), those who are willing to label behaviors
as discriminatory might also be those individuals who are more willing to
report the experiences. Second, because it might be threatening to oneself
to recall instances where one experienced discrimination but failed to report
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discrimination. Together, these reporting biases might lead survey respondents
to overestimate the extent to which they report discrimination. Finally,
retrospective reports oftentimes do not examine the specific instances of dis-
crimination survey respondents recall; thus it is difficult to know what types
of discriminatory events individuals are considering, as well as the severity
of those events (see Schwarz and Sudman 1994 for a review of research on




Experimental analogues represent a second methodology for assessing
discrimination claims. In these types of studies, participants are asked to imag-
ine being the target of discrimination and are then asked to predict how
they would respond. These studies generally find that participants are highly
confident that they would report discrimination if they were to experience
it (Shelton and Stewart 2004; Swim and Hyers 1999; Woodzicka and
LaFrance 2001). For example, when women were asked to predict how they
would respond when a man made several derogatory comments about women
in a group discussion context, only 1 percent predicted that they would ignore
the comments. In contrast, most of the women (81 percent) predicted that
they would engage in some form of confrontational behavior (e.g., remark
on the inappropriateness of the comments, question the perpetrator, use
sarcasm or humor) (Swim and Hyers 1999). Similarly, when women were
asked to imagine being interviewed by a man who asked sexually harassing
interview questions, most (62 percent) anticipated refusing to answer at least
one of the interviewers’ questions (Woodzick and Lafrance 2001). In short,
experimental analogue research paints the picture that targets of discrimi-
nation readily report discrimination.
Although experimental analogues provide a great deal of control over
the nature of discriminatory events participants are asked to reflect upon,
this type of approach is particularly problematic. First, participants might
be responding with their thoughts about how they should respond rather
than how they actually would respond. Second, as we will highlight in more
detail below, people often overlook the impact that situations have on their
behavior (Gilbert 1998), and they may thus fail to recognize situational
barriers that might prevent them from reporting discrimination. Indeed, the
extremely high rates of anticipated reporting behavior suggest that individuals
are not attending to these forces when predicting their behavior. As we will
describe below, research has provided strong evidence that responses in experi-
mental analogues are not particularly valid indicators of real responses to
discrimination. That is, people are quite poor at accurately predicting how
they would personally respond when facing discrimination—and more impor-
tantly, these perceptions do not accurately reflect victims’ typical behavior.
 




When researchers have placed participants in laboratory interactions
that parallel the descriptions provided in experimental analogue studies, the
findings are quite different. For example, when women actually interacted
in a group where a man made derogatory sexist comments, the most frequent
response these women made (55 percent) was ignoring the comments (Swim
and Hyers 1999). Recall that just 1 percent of the women actually anticipated
that they would ignore the comments. Similarly, when women were actually
interviewed by a man who delivered sexually harassing interview questions,
not a single woman refused to answer the interview questions (despite the
fact that a majority of women in the experimental analogue study anticipated
refusing to answer the questions) (Woodzicka and LaFrance 2001). These
experimental data suggest that women often do not directly report discrimi-
nation to the perpetrator. Furthermore, individuals are unable to predict how
they would actually behave when faced with experiences involving discrimi-
nation. This latter finding is consistent with a large body of research showing
that individuals oftentimes fail to adequately account for the pressure that
situational factors place on their behavior (Gilbert 1998).
There are a number of benefits associated with studying reports of
discrimination in the laboratory. First, the laboratory affords a great degree of
control over the nature of the discriminatory event. By holding discriminatory
events constant, laboratory research circumvents some of the problems asso-
ciated with relying on respondents’ personal generation of discriminatory
events, which can be influenced by memory distortions and reporting biases.
Second, the laboratory assesses actual reporting behavior, so these reports
are more valid than participants’ predictions of how they think they might
behave in discriminatory situations. However, the laboratory is not a panacea.
Because college students represent an inexpensive and readily available study
population, they are overrepresented in laboratory research, which can lead
to questions about whether the behaviors observed among this population
will generalize to other populations (Sears 1986). Additionally, because lab-
oratory settings involve strangers who are typically involved in a brief single
interaction, laboratory experiments lack some of the realism that might occur




Rather than argue that one type of methodology is best at accurately
capturing reports of discrimination, we believe that there are beneficial aspects
of both retrospective studies and high-impact laboratory studies, and by
drawing on the strengths of each method, scholars will be in a better position
to design strong approaches to examining this question. Scholars utilizing
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retrospective reports of responses to discrimination might avail themselves
of methodologies that are increasingly employed in social and personality
psychological research, such as experience sampling methodologies or inform-
ant reports of behavior. Experience sampling methodology, such as having
individuals keep diaries of their experiences with discrimination, might
mitigate some of the memory distortion biases if respondents are encouraged
to complete their diary entries after every experience with discrimination.
Alternatively, experimenters could provide participants with PDAs or beepers
and then contact them over a period of weeks and have them report their
experiences with discrimination that occurred on that day. This type of approach
also has the benefit of capturing detailed information about each type of
discriminatory event, which will be useful in understanding how different
characteristics of the events might contribute to various types of responses.
The few studies that have used a daily diary approach to examine self-reports
of discrimination experiences provide an excellent example of these benefits
(Stangor et al. 2002; Swim et al. 2003). For example, Swim et al. (2003)
found that African Americans experience small daily racial hassles more
frequently than egregious racial events, but, nonetheless, these daily events
are stressful. Additionally, African American students rarely reported these
discriminatory experiences to university authorities, but more than half shared
their experiences with friends.
High-impact laboratory studies can also be improved by drawing on some
of the strengths of retrospective report studies. For example, by creating lab-
oratory situations that closely resemble frequently reported discriminatory
experiences, generalizations from the lab may have more ecological validity.
Both the Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001) and Shelton and Stewart (2004)
job interview studies described previously head in the direction of creating lab
situations that closely resemble real-life settings. Additionally, lab studies could
bring existing friends or work colleagues into the lab and create a situation
where one member of the pair engages in discriminatory behavior (see Collins
and Feeney 2004 for an example of conducting relationship research utilizing
both members of dating couples). This type of approach can overcome the
limitations that typically characterize stranger interactions in the laboratory.
Finally, lab studies would benefit by more frequently examining the gen-
erality of the findings among populations other than college students.
Despite the various strengths and weaknesses of retrospective report and
laboratory investigations of reporting discrimination, it becomes evident that
both of these approaches reach at least one common conclusion: individuals
who perceive themselves as targets of discrimination often do not share this
information with others. This is particularly likely to be the case when one
considers reports to authorities or legal institutions (Major and Kaiser 2005;
Nielsen and Nelson 2005; Stangor et al. 2003; Swim et al. 2003). We next
turn to examining reasons for this depressed reporting of discrimination
complaints.
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The Costs of Reporting Discrimination
 
Why would people who believe that they are targets of discrimination
be reluctant to report it? Data suggest that this reluctance is due in part to
the perception that the costs of reporting discrimination are sometimes too
severe. Individuals who claim discrimination report that they fear being per-
ceived as a troublemaker or experiencing retaliation (Kaiser and Miller 2004).
Further, they report they often are targeted by retaliation when they make such
claims (Feagin and Sikes 1994; Fitzgerald, Swan, and Fischer 1995; Kaiser
and Miller 2001, 2003; Latting 1993). Experimental research substantiates
these expectations that reporting discrimination is costly. Experiments show
that blaming outcomes on discrimination can damage perceptions of the dis-
crimination claimant’s character, even if his or her claim is clearly reasonable.
In the first experiment to show this effect (Kaiser and Miller 2001), people
(most of whom were European American) read a description of an African
American man who had received a failing test grade from a European American
evaluator. They also learned either that the test administrator had informed the
man that it was unlikely, somewhat likely, or absolutely certain that the person
who evaluated his test was racist. Participants then examined a survey ostensibly
completed by the Black man, in which he indicated that his grade was due
primarily either to discrimination, his test answers, or to the difficulty of the test.
Participants then completed a measure of derogation of the man (e.g., ratings of
the extent to which he was hypersensitive, irritating, a troublemaker, a complainer).
When the man blamed his failing grade on discrimination, he was derogated
to a greater extent than when he blamed it on his test answers or the difficulty
of the test. Furthermore, this derogation effect occurred regardless of the like-
lihood that a racist evaluator graded the target’s test. That is, when the man blamed
his grade on discrimination, he experienced damage to his reputation even when
discrimination was clearly responsible for the grade (Kaiser and Miller 2001).
A follow-up experiment assessed the boundaries of this derogation effect
by having college students (again, predominately European American) examine
the application material of an African American job candidate who failed to
receive a job he desired (Kaiser and Miller 2003). Participants then read
comments purportedly made by the European American interviewer in charge
of the hiring decision that expressed either no animosity toward Blacks,
moderate levels of racism, or blatant old-fashioned racism (i.e., he made
statements such as “Black people are just not as smart as White people” and
“I have never hired a Black person and I never will”). Participants then viewed
a survey ostensibly completed by the job candidate, in which he attributed
the job rejection to discrimination, his interviewing skills, or the strong com-
petition for the job. As in the study described above (Kaiser and Miller 2001),
the applicant who blamed his rejection on discrimination was derogated more
than the applicant who blamed his rejection on other causes, even when
he faced blatant old-fashioned racism.
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Importantly, research indicates that members of low- as well as high-status
groups react negatively to discrimination claimants. In addition, members
of high-status groups who claim they are victims of discrimination are reacted
to just as negatively as members of low-status groups who claim discrimina-
tion. This was shown in an experiment (Stangor et al. 2003) in which African
American and European American individuals read about an individual
(portrayed as either African American or European American) who blamed
a negative event either on discrimination or on the poor quality of his answers.
African American and European American participants were equally likely
to derogate the person who blamed negative events on discrimination rather
than on himself. Furthermore, the African American and European American
discrimination claimants were equally likely to be derogated. This effect
occurred among both college students and older adults. Similar results were
found in another experiment in which male and female participants read
about a woman or man who blamed a failing test grade from a sexist opposite-
gender evaluator on sexism or his/her test answers (Garcia et al. 2005).
Regardless of their gender, participants perceived the male and female test-
taker as more of a complainer when he or she attributed failure to discrim-
ination rather than test answers (Stangor et al. 2003 report similar findings).
Additionally, individuals liked the test-taker belonging to their own gender
group (but not the other gender group) less when the test-taker blamed failure
on discrimination instead of test answers. This latter finding suggests that
people may become particularly angry at ingroup members who make
their own group look bad by blaming events on sexism (Garcia et al. 2005).
However, this latter reaction might be especially characteristic of individuals
who do not consider their ingroup as an important part of the self (Kaiser
and Hagiwara 2006).
The social psychological laboratory work on claiming discrimination
paints a consistent picture that claiming discrimination is an interpersonally
costly behavior. Furthermore, these interpersonal costs are incurred by
members of both high- and low-status groups, even when the audience for
such a claim comprises members of one’s own social group, and even when
there is very good reason to claim discrimination. Given these costs to
one’s personal reputation, it is not surprising that individuals often are
reluctant to share their discrimination perceptions with others. This may
explain why individuals often opt toward sharing their discrimination
perceptions with trusted others rather than with others who control
important resources, such as employment outcomes (Shelton and Stewart
2004; Stangor et al. 2002; Swim et al. 2003). Though there is consensus
that discrimination claimants do incur costs to their character and
reputation, there is less understanding of why this occurs. We next turn
our attention to arguing that the answer to this question can be under-
stood by integrating this work with theory on meritocratic worldview
endorsement.
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THE MERITOCRATIC WORLDVIEW AND REPORTING 
DISCRIMINATION
 
Earlier in this article, we argued that endorsement of the meritocratic
cultural worldview is an important moderator in understanding whether
members of high- and low-status groups perceive themselves as targets of
discrimination. We also believe that this worldview has important implica-
tions for understanding the costs associated with reporting discrimination.
Because a meritocracy worldview leads to the inference that individuals and
groups are responsible for the outcomes they receive in life, this worldview
justifies hierarchical social arrangements. When members of low-status groups
claim to be the target of discrimination, they call into question the basic
assumptions upon which the meritocratic worldview is based. They also rep-
resent a challenge to the legitimacy of the status hierarchy. Specifically, when
individuals make discrimination claims, they communicate that the United
States is not an open and fair society and that some social groups face
unfairness, have little control over their outcomes, and are less able to obtain
the American Dream. Thus, according to this perspective, individuals who
endorse the meritocratic worldview should be particularly likely to derogate
discrimination claimants (see Kaiser 2005 for a more detailed discussion).
Several studies provide evidence that members of low-status groups who
report discrimination are most likely to experience reputational damage at the
hands of members of high-status groups who strongly endorse the meritocratic
worldview. For example, in one study men completed the Social Dominance
Orientation Scale, a measure that taps components of the meritocratic world-
view (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and then engaged in a computerized inter-
action with a male and female confederate (the confederates were actually
computer scripts) (Maass et al. 2003). In one condition, the female confederate
was portrayed as a feminist who worked with a union that defends women’s
rights, and, in the other condition, she was portrayed as traditionally feminine.
In the former condition, one could infer that the confederate blames dis-
crimination for women’s devalued position in the social hierarchy. Thus, she
should pose a strong challenge to the meritocratic worldview. Under the guise
that the experiment concerned picture memory, the men were instructed to
send computer images to the women. Some of these images were hardcore
pornographic. During the interaction, the male confederate sent several hard-
core pornographic images to the female confederate (who objected each time)
and encouraged the male participant to follow his lead by also sending porno-
graphic images to the female confederate. Results indicated that the male
participants harassed the female confederate to a greater extent (i.e., sent
her more frequent and offensive pornographic images) when she was portrayed
as a feminist than when she was portrayed as feminine. Moreover, across
both the feminist and feminine conditions, participants who endorsed social
dominance orientation were more likely to engage in sexual harassment.
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However, this relationship between social dominance orientation and
harassment was especially strong when the female confederate was portrayed
as a feminist. This study provides important evidence that women who pub-
licly blame their gender group’s outcomes on prejudice are treated negatively
by men, particularly if those men endorse the meritocratic worldview.
Another series of studies also provides evidence that endorsing the
meritocratic worldview moderates high-status individuals’ reactions toward
low-status discrimination claimants (Kaiser, Dyrenforth, and Hagiwara in press).
In one study, European American participants who had previously completed
a Just World Beliefs measure engaged in a computerized interaction where
they witnessed an African American man receive a failing test grade from
a White evaluator who made a blatant racist comment. Participants then
saw that the African American man attributed his grade to discrimination,
his test answers, or the difficulty of the test. Participants then completed a
measure of the extent to which they perceived the African American man
as a complainer. The more participants endorsed the Belief in a Just World,
the more they perceived the African American man as a complainer when
he blamed his failure on discrimination. Endorsement of the Belief in a Just
World was not positively related to derogation of the African American man
in the answer attribution and test difficulty attribution conditions. Thus, this
study demonstrates that derogation of discrimination claimants is more likely
to occur among individuals who strongly endorse the meritocratic worldview.
In a second study, European American students who had previously
completed a measure designed to tap several components of the meritocratic
worldview read an essay that had been purportedly written by an African
American student at their university (Kaiser et al. in press, Experiment 2).
In one condition, the student wrote about receiving a poor grade and sub-
sequent rude treatment from a teaching assistant. The essay writer went on
to argue that he had spoken with a friend who works in the teaching assistant’s
department and learned that other minority students also reported having
problems with this teaching assistant. Finally, the essay writer concluded his
essay by stating that the teaching assistant was a racist. In a second condition,
the participants read the exact same essay, but the student learned that other
students had reported problems with the teaching assistant, claiming he was
rude to 
 
all students at the university
 
. In this condition, the essay writer stated
that the teaching assistant was a jerk. This latter condition is important
because it controls for the possibility that individuals dislike people who
generally blame their failure on other people. In other words, this experiment
compares two conditions that involve failing to take responsibility for one’s
failure, but only one (the racist teaching assistant condition) threatens the
legitimacy of the status hierarchy. The more participants endorsed the mer-
itocratic worldview, the more negatively they evaluated the discrimination
claimant (viewed him as a complainer and disliked him). This relationship
between meritocratic worldview endorsement and negative evaluations was
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not evident when the essay writer blamed a negative event on a teaching
assistant who was a jerk. This study provides important evidence that indi-
viduals who endorse the meritocratic worldview are particularly likely to react
negatively toward individuals who blame events on racism, and not just on
any manifestation of unfairness.
Finally, a study by Jost and Burgess (2000) also is consistent with the
notion that meritocratic worldview endorsement will result in negative
reactions toward discrimination claimants and further demonstrates that this
relationship may also characterize the responses of members of low-status
groups. In this study, men and women read about a woman who sued her
university after she was denied entry into the university’s honors program
(her qualifications were ambiguous). Additionally, participants learned that
men were accepted into the program at a higher rate than women. Participants
then completed a number of measures including their attitudes toward Ann
(e.g., “I feel proud of Ann,” “I feel that Ann has been unfair to the university”
(reversed)), as well as a measure of meritocratic worldview endorsement (Belief
in a Just World Scale, Rubin and Peplau 1975). The results revealed that
the more men endorsed the Belief in a Just World, the less favorably they
evaluated Ann. The same relationship was observed for women, but it was
not significant (though the relationship was not significantly different than
the one observed for men). This latter finding provides some evidence that
meritocratic worldview endorsement is important in understanding how low-
status group members respond to discrimination claimants belonging to their




A review of the empirical literature reveals that even when individuals
perceive themselves as targets of discrimination, they will oftentimes be reluc-
tant to share these perceptions with others. Because discrimination claimants
often experience reputational damage (even when their claims are reasonable),
it is not surprising that people are reluctant to share these perceptions with
others. Of importance, however, our review highlights that the costs of report-
ing discrimination will be most evident when the audience for these reports
endorse meritocratic beliefs associated with the dominant meritocratic world-
view. In the final section of this article, we will consider the implications
of our research review for legal issues and scholarship.
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL ISSUES
 
There is growing interest in examining how theoretical and empirical
insights from social psychology can inform law and legal processes. Indeed,
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a number of legal scholars are applying social psychological research on preju-
dice (particularly social cognition research) to the study of legal issues, such
as employment discrimination law (Krieger 1995, 2004; Nielson and Nelson
2005), affirmative action law (Krieger 1998), sexual harassment law (Beiner
2004), disparate impact and disparate treatment law (Green 2003, 2005),
judicial decision making (Haney Lopez 2000), the effectiveness of internal
grievance procedures and Equal Employment Opportunity training (Bisom-Rapp
2001a, 2001b), and laws regulating media coverage of programming where
ethnic minorities are frequently viewed in stereotypic contexts (Kang 2005).
This type of interdisciplinary approach has the potential to discover
(and ideally remedy) legal processes that rely on inaccurate assumptions about
human thought and behavior. For instance, in the case of discrimination
law, many scholars have noted that legal definitions of discrimination are
outdated (e.g., discrimination has been viewed as reflecting conscious moti-
vation on the part of the perpetrator) (see Krieger 1998, 2004) and would
benefit by incorporating social psychological work on implicit social cognition
(e.g., which argues that discrimination can also occur without self-awareness
and conscious motivation) (e.g., see Fiske 1998 for a review). The realization
of this gap between legal and social psychological processes was particularly
disheartening to one of the authors of this article while she served in a
jury pool in a case involving a Latino defendant. When each prospective
juror was interviewed, the judge handling the case asked each juror in public
whether the defendant’s ethnicity would influence how he or she processes
the information presented in the case. Not surprisingly, all jurors stated in
open court that they were not prejudiced people and would not consider
the defendant’s ethnicity during the trial. To a social psychologist, this type
of approach (although good-intentioned) is flawed. It ignores the likely
pronounced influence of self-presentational concerns on juror’s responses
(e.g., not wanting to appear as a racist) (e.g., Crandall et al. 2002), the substantial
evidence that people are often unaware of their mental processes (Nisbett
and Wilson 1977), and evidence that even those who attempt to suppress
negative stereotypes are often unsuccessful at doing so (Bodenhausen and
Macrae 1998).
In the remainder of this article, we will explore some potential areas
where social psychological research can contribute to an understanding of
the legal processes involved in perceiving and reporting discrimination. Our
discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as a jumping
off point for a continued dialogue between lawyers and social psychologists.
We believe this type of interdisciplinary approach to employment discrimi-
nation holds a great deal of promise for both social psychologists and legal
scholars (see Nielsen and Nelson 2005 for an excellent example of this inter-
disciplinary approach).
The research reviewed in this article has a number of important impli-
cations for employment discrimination law and public policy. Perhaps of
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greatest significance, employment discrimination litigation relies in large part
on the ability of individual employees to recognize personal discrimination
and, once recognized, to seek legal remedies for these claims. That is, that
the most common type of employment discrimination litigation involves indi-
vidual private litigants making claims of disparate treatment (Donohue and
Siegelman 1991). Because cognitive and motivational processes represent
significant barriers that prevent individuals from recognizing and reporting
discrimination, this type of legal approach is likely to be of limited value
in remedying discrimination in the workplace.
For example, because modern forms of discrimination are often subtle,
difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis, and at odds with strongly held
beliefs that motivate individuals to see their world as fair and legitimate,
employment discrimination will frequently go unnoticed or undetected. Fur-
thermore, even when discrimination is recognized, substantial interpersonal
barriers, such as the fear of retaliation, job loss, and social rejection more
generally, will prevent those who perceive grievances from seeking legal action.
Thus, a legal system that relies on the individual claimant to recognize and
report discrimination (i.e., current EEO policy) is misguided, according to
the social psychological literature (see Kreiger 1998 for a similar discussion).
The cognitive and motivational barriers to perceiving and reporting
discrimination represent just the initial difficulties facing an individual dis-
crimination claimant. Indeed, Nielsen and Nelson (2005) estimate that only
28 percent of the discrimination claims brought to the EEOC result in favor-
able decisions for the plaintiff (of these favorable decisions, 99 percent stem
from EEOC actions and legal settlement and 1 percent stems from litigated
trial victory). Thus, individual employment discrimination cases are typically
unsuccessful from the plaintiff’s perspective.
The social psychological research reviewed in this section indicates that
there are a variety of reasons why judges and juries may be predisposed to
think that a discrimination claim brought by a single member of a targeted
group is unjustified. First, because the information concerns a single individual
rather than a group, judges and juries might have difficulty discerning a sys-
tematic pattern of discrimination and by default look for unique character-
istics of the individual as an explanation for negative employment treatment.
Second, judges and juries may falsely assume that members of protected groups
err on the side of vigilance—claiming discrimination when it does not objec-
tively exist, rather than on the side of minimization—failing to see or report
discrimination even when it occurs. Third, judges and juries are unlikely to
recognize the significant social costs entailed in bringing a discrimination
claim. Like the participants in the studies by Swim and Hyers (1999) and
Woodzicka and LaFrance (2001), they may falsely think that if they were
in that situation and it truly was discrimination, they would speak up. This
false insight might lead them to wonder why other group members have not
stepped forward to bring similar charges against the employer. Fourth, judges
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and juries, like the participants in our studies, are likely to think that the
person who claims he or she is a victim of discrimination is a troublemaker,
even if the evidence is quite clear that the plaintiff had good cause (Kaiser
and Miller 2001). This will be especially true for individuals who strongly
endorse meritocratic beliefs or when these beliefs are activated in the
situation (Kaiser 2005). In short, lawyers face an uphill battle when they
represent single individuals who are bringing group-related discriminatory
charges against an employer.
Lawyers for the plaintiff can draw upon social psychological research
to counter these biases. Social psychological experiments showing minimi-
zation biases can be cited to document how difficult it can be to perceive
discrimination. Experiments showing the social costs of reporting discrimi-
nation can be used to illustrate the difficulty of publicly claiming discrimi-
nation. Experiments can be cited to show that reporting discrimination is
an infrequent behavior and that most individuals have false insight into their
own willingness to report discrimination.
Social psychological research can also be used to inform jury selection
decisions in discrimination cases. For example, experiments show that indi-
viduals who strongly endorse meritocratic cultural beliefs are more likely to
negatively evaluate individuals who claim they are victims of discrimination.
Experiments also show that lawyers should not assume that jurors who share
social categorical memberships with their clients will necessarily display greater
empathy with the client than those who belong to different groups. As noted
above, there is some evidence that people are harder on members of their own
group who claim discrimination than they are on members of an outgroup.
Finally, social psychologists possess powerful tools—methodological
expertise and empirical data derived from controlled experiments—that can
help contribute to the success of legal processes. The successful use of sound
empirical data can help lawyers overcome the biases inherent in relying on
commonsense understandings of human behavior. Social psychologists’ meth-
odological expertise can help to clarify apparent inconsistencies in human
behavior, for example, between what people say they will do and what they
actually do when they encounter situations where they are potentially targets
of discrimination. By educating judges and jurors about social psychology
and the research process, legal scholars and lawyers can help bring important
evidence to bear on legal decisionmaking. Unfortunately, social psychologists
are often untrained in how to go about contributing to the legal profession,
and they will need assistance from lawyers in understanding prevailing models
of legal processes, advice on how to competently convey experimental evidence
in court, and on being an effective expert witness more generally. Once armed
with a greater understanding of legal processes, social psychologists will be
better able to collect the empirical data that are most useful to those in the
legal profession. We believe these gains can best be made through collaborative,
interdisciplinary exchanges between legal scholars and social psychologists.
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